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Assaultive Words
and Constitutional Norms
Catherine J. Ross
On college campuses across the nation people have sought to silence words
that wound. They strive to ban expression they blame for contributing to a
“rape culture.” Some students demand that colleges censor student speech
that appears to denigrate individuals or groups. The question I tackle here is
what—if anything—the Constitution permits authorities to do about assaultive
student speech in the venues governed by the First Amendment.
Expression that may be regarded as assaultive is usually protected by the
First Amendment—at least at public colleges and universities, which are units
of the state. Protecting offensive speech from censorship also promotes higher
education’s norms, which is why most private institutions of higher learning
have voluntarily bound themselves to free-speech principles.1
Campuses are rocked by racially and sexually offensive speech and counter
speech. Offensive speech and counter speech, including demonstrations and
calls for policies that shield the vulnerable and repercussions for offenders,
are both protected by the Constitution. Yet some college administrations
regulate this protected speech. Expression on both sides of a cultural and
political divide brings to the fore a conflict that has been simmering in legal
commentary for about two decades: the tension between the often competing
demands of the First Amendment’s express guarantee of free speech and the
Fourteenth Amendment’s implicit promise of dignity and equality. This clash
between two fundamental principles seems to have been exacerbated recently
by a renewed focus on identity politics both on campus and in national and
international affairs.
Catherine J. Ross is Fred C. Stevenson Research Professor, George Washington University
Law School. The author thanks the organizers of and participants in the symposium held at
Georgetown Law School on October 14, 2016, the George Washington University Law School
and reference librarian Mary Kate Hunter. All errors are of course my own.
1.

When I speak of the First Amendment on college campuses, I will not always distinguish
between public institutions and private schools that have pledged to honor free speech.
More than three-quarters of the nation’s college students are enrolled in public community
or four-year colleges and public universities (collectively, “colleges”). Where private colleges
have undertaken to honor free speech, I have argued that First Amendment doctrine
provides the best guidance as to what such a commitment means. Catherine J. Ross, Common
Sense about the Chilling of Campus Speech, Cato Unbound (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.catounbound.org/2016/01/14/catherine-j-ross/common-sense-about-chilling-campus-speech.
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The First and Fourteenth Amendments bind only the government. Students
on both sides of the controversy over assaultive speech avail themselves of
free speech, and some (notably minorities and women) are also beneficiaries
of the Fourteenth Amendment and statutes that promote the Fourteenth
Amendment’s anti-discriminatory aims. When students speak or act, however,
they do so as private parties, free of constitutional constraints, though not
necessarily of all legal accountability.
In discussing assaultive speech I focus on violent words through the lens of
the First Amendment, which strictly limits the capacity of college administrators
to regulate offensive expression or to accede to student demands that they do
so. Unlike some intellectually provocative efforts to challenge or work around
existing constitutional requirements, imagining a better kind of law,2 I aim to
contribute to this symposium by reminding those who come at the issues from
other directions of the constraints the Speech Clause imposes on efforts to
control what people say to one another, even on college campuses.
Section I briefly introduces the problem of derogatory expression. Section
II addresses the reported diminution of concern about free expression among
at least some college students. Section III reviews the centrality of the free
exchange of ideas to higher education’s unique mission: teaching and research
to promote new understanding through critical thinking that tests existing
orthodoxies. The section introduces three seminal reports on free expression
in universities that—together with constitutional imperatives—provide the
starting point for my analysis. In Section IV I turn to regulation of student
speech embodied in campus speech codes, subjecting common provisions of
such codes to First Amendment analysis, and discussing the constitutional
impediments to bans on hate speech and harassment in any setting, including
elementary and secondary schools, largely (though not exclusively) drawing
on controversies about racial disparagement. Section V expressly addresses
gendered verbal assaults and the conundrum that results as colleges confront
federal demands that colleges control what students say to one another to
avoid creating a hostile environment, even as administrators must respect
students’ expressive rights. In Section VI, I examine the implications of the
fact that a college is more than a public space or workplace—it may also be a
student’s home; different First Amendment principles may affect the rights
of listeners confronted with unwelcome speech in their homes, and of speakers
expressing themselves in the privacy of their homes. Finally, Section VII
proposes some solutions by analyzing what college administrators, faculty,
and students can do within the confines of constitutional doctrine to temper
the incidence of and harms caused by verbal assaults, closing with proposals
directed at law schools.
2.

E.g., Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling,
17 Harvard C.R.–C.L. L. Rev. 133 (1982); Mari J. Matsuda, et al., Words That Wound:
Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment (1993).
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I. Demeaning Expression
No one should entertain any doubt that words can wound. “Sticks and
stones,” the children’s rhyme, is simply wrong: Words can hurt as much or
more than sticks and stones, as asserted in the competing saying, “The pen is
mightier than the sword.” This much has been clear in scholarly work and case
law for decades.3 It has been apparent to sensitive humans for much longer.
Insults and derogatory comments addressed to groups or individuals
can feel assaultive, and may even be intended as assaults. Targets and other
listeners may justifiably perceive demeaning, derogatory expression as verbal
assaults. As Justice Breyer observed, speech can be like an “assault, seriously
harm[ing] a private individual.”4 The harms often linger.
I am deeply, personally aware of what name-calling means and what it can
lead to. At the risk of implicating Godwin’s Law, when my father was growing
up in what is now Gdansk, Jews were thrown out of the public schools. Until
he was sent abroad so that he could attend school himself, my father was tasked
with escorting his younger brother to the newly established Jewish school as
people threw rocks at them shouting “Jew” and less genteel pejoratives. My
father, his parents, and his brother ultimately reached the U.S. in December
1940. When the Second World War ended they had lost some fifty close
relatives to the Holocaust.
In the contemporary United States, racist expression on campuses drew
national attention in the fall of 2015, beginning with demonstrations at the
University of Missouri, Columbia, protesting the university’s passivity in
response to racist expression and conduct (including smearing feces to draw
a swastika on university property). Demonstrations and resignations rippled
across the nation’s colleges. And the incidents—both the expression of racist
sentiments and the demonstrations and demands for action they elicited—have
not abated.
One week before the conference that gave rise to this symposium, a column
titled “Slurs and Insults, Again” in the Chronicle of Higher Education listed
events of the preceding week, a particularly active one in the arena of reported
slurs: At the University of Missouri, “members of a fraternity allegedly
shouted racial slurs and obscenities at two black students;” at the University of
Michigan, fliers “urged white women not to date black men” and encouraged
“ ‘Euro-Americans’ to stop ‘denying their heritage’ ”; students at the University
of North Dakota posted photos of white women in blackface on Snapchat,
captioned “Black Lives Matter”; and at the University of Mississippi, a
Facebook post “appeared to advocate lynching.”5 Those were the incidents
of racist expression by students captured in just one column about the “past
3.

At least since Kenneth Clark’s research on internalization of assaults on dignity based on
race. See Delgado, supra note 2, at 137-38.

4.

Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 461 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring).

5.

Lawrence Biemiller, What You Need to Know About the Past 7 Days, Chron. Higher Educ. (Oct.
2, 2016), http://www.chronicle.com/article/What-You-Need-to-Know-About/237949.
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7 days.” But there was more. At East Tennessee State, a freshman tried to
provoke Black Lives Matters demonstrators by taunting them; dressed in a
gorilla suit, he waved bananas and ropes in their faces.6
Those were only the student speakers. That same week, University of
Tennessee College of Law Professor Glenn Reynolds tweeted that drivers
should run over protesters who had swarmed a highway in Charlotte,
North Carolina, after police shot yet another black man (Reynolds later
apologized).7 Those attending the meeting of the National Association for
College Admissions Counseling were roiled when the association’s president
said “all lives matter,” in what he intended as a gesture of “sympathy and
solidarity.” “I wasn’t aware of the code,” he said. He didn’t realize his words
would be understood as a rejection of Black Lives Matter. In context, his goals
should have been clear—he was discussing his dismay over the death of a black
teenager shot by police.8
Since October 2016, when this symposium was held at Georgetown,
public norms seem to have deteriorated further. Following the 2016 election,
reports of hostile speech based on race and ethnicity, along with hate crimes,
skyrocketed. Campuses serving students in every age group have been
affected.9 These unfolding developments make it even more imperative that
campus officials comprehend the limitations the First Amendment imposes on
their ability to silence derogatory speech.
II. Reported Student Devaluation of Free Expression
It seems that too often, too many contemporary college students have little
comprehension of or devotion to free speech—a founding principle of liberty
in all its dimensions. According to a 2015 Pew poll, forty percent of millennials
believe society should prevent speech that offends minority groups.10 A survey
administered the same year by Yale’s Buckley Center found that seventy-two
6.

David Floyd, ETSU Student in a Gorilla Mask Confronts Black Lives Matter Demonstrators, East
Tennessean (Sept. 28, 2016), http://easttennessean.com/2016/09/28/man-in-a-gorilla-mask
-confronts-black-lives-matter-demonstrators-at-etsu/.

7.

Katherine Mangan, A Gorilla-Masked Student’s Attempt to Provoke Is Met with Peace: At East Tennessee
State, an Offensive Stunt Leads to a Larger Conversation about Race Relations, Chron. Higher Educ.
(Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.chronicle.com/article/A-Gorilla-Masked-Student-s/237964.

8.

Eric Hoover, How 3 Words Roiled an Education Conference, Chron. Higher Educ. (Sept. 26,
2016), http://www.chronicle.com/article/How-3-Words-Roiled-an/237898.

9.

See Caitlin Dickerson & Stephanie Saul, Hostile Acts Against Minorities, Often Invoking Trump, Erupt
Across U.S., N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 2016 at P12 (discussing incidents and responses on college
campuses); Maureen B. Costello, The Trump Effect: The Impact of the 2016 Presidential Election on
our Nation’s Schools, Southern Poverty L. Ctr. (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.splcenter.
org/20161128/trump-effect-impact-2016-presidential-election-our-nations-schools (reporting
incidents involving “slurs and derogatory language, and disturbing incidents involving
swastikas, Nazi salutes and Confederate flags” in grades K-12).

10.

See Jacob Poushter, 40% of Millennials OK with Limiting Speech Offensive to Minorities, Pew Res. Ctr.
(Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/20/40-of-millennials-ok-withlimiting-speech-offensive-to-minorities/.
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percent of college students in the U.S. support disciplinary action against “any
student or faculty member on campus who uses language that is considered
racist, sexist, homophobic or otherwise offensive.”11
Reports of diminished student concern about freedom of speech are a
startling turnabout. In the 1960s students feared that administrators would
silence their speech as students pressed for more personal liberty on every
front—liberty to challenge authority, engage in political protest on campus,
disrupt classes and ROTC; and freedom to enjoy sex, drugs and rock ’n’ roll—a
battle they largely won.
As recently as the spring of 2015, when historian Joan Wallace Scott
addressed the Association of American University Professors on the topic of
“The New Thought Police,” censorious college administrators seemed to pose
the primary risk to campus expression. Scott focused on deans and college
presidents who silence faculty members under the guise of enforcing “civility.”12
(There is much to be said about efforts by administrators, state legislators and
officials, and even peers who intimidate or penalize faculty members for their
expression, but I will leave that rich topic to another day.)
Today, as First Amendment scholar Geoffrey Stone summarized it, we
find ourselves “in an era of political correctness in which students themselves
demand censorship, and colleges and universities, afraid to offend their
students, too often surrender academic freedom to charges of offense.”13 The
latest iteration of student activists demands that college administrators silence
their peers and, sometimes, their professors. Many, perhaps most, of the
controversies on college campuses from 2015 until now have centered on or
implicated free speech. As First Amendment scholar and Columbia University
President Lee Bollinger explained recent events, turmoil has surrounded
“the speech of fellow students, of residence hall administrators, of faculty, of
institutions through the naming of buildings and the display of pictures, and
of outside people invited to campus.” “Sometimes,” he said, “there were calls
for bans on speech and official punishments.”14
Responding to student concerns, diversity and sensitivity officers are
advising students and faculty alike to use words cautiously, and to avoid the
newly minted category of speech known as “micro-aggressions.” Don’t say
11.

Greg Lukianoff, Campus Free Speech Has Been in Trouble for a Long Time, Cato Unbound (Jan. 4,
2016), https://www.cato-unbound.org/2016/01/04/greg-lukianoff/campus-free-speech-hasbeen-trouble-long-time (Yale’s William F. Buckley, Jr. program survey). See also Poushter,
supra note 10.

12.

Joan W. Scott, The New Thought Police: Why are Campus Administrators Invoking Civility to Silence Critical
Speech?, Nation, May 4, 2015, at 13.

13.

U. Chicago L. Sch., Prof. Geoffrey Stone Discusses Free Speech on Campus at the
American Law Institute (June 6, 2016), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/prof-geoffreystone-discusses-free-speech-campus-american-law-institute.

14.

Lee C. Bollinger, Commentary: The No-Censorship Approach to Life, Chron. Higher Educ. (Sept.
18, 2016), http://www.chronicle.com/article/The-No-Censorship-Approach-to/237807.
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“you guys” if women are in the group. Don’t ask where someone grew up.15
Use the correct pronoun, but you might get in trouble if you ask someone
which pronoun best captures his/her/their/ze identity, as one faculty member
did. While rejecting the notion that rampant political correctness has created
a “pervasive crisis” of free speech on campus, a nuanced 2016 PEN America
report warned that a pattern of students suppressing the expression of their
peers “is at risk of escalating absent concerted action.”16
Recently, students have been in the vanguard, demanding that offensive,
speech be silenced. Students ask to be protected from hurtful words, sentiments,
even gestures, and inadvertent facial clues or rolling eyes that communicate
dismissal.17 They seek the coercive power of authority to enforce laudable social
norms—respect, dignity, and equality regardless of race, ethnicity, gender,
gender identity, and so forth. Meritorious as these proclaimed goals are, the
rules and penalties some students lobby for would suppress the expressive
rights of others including students, faculty, and invited guests, a particularly
disturbing prospect at an institution devoted to the academic enterprise.
III. The University’s Unique Mission
In the past half-century, private universities produced three foundational
reports on the role of free expression in the academy. These documents, which
explain why free expression matters so much in higher education, set out some
of the principles beyond the law that inform my discussion. All of them are
infused with the goals of classical liberal arts education, including teaching
students how to think critically.
A. Yale’s Woodward Report
In 1974, following a widely noted incident in which hecklers prevented
a scheduled debate featuring an outside speaker known for his view that
blacks were genetically inferior to whites, Yale President Kingman Brewster
appointed C. Vann Woodward, a historian of the American South well-versed
in the meaning of protest, to chair an inquiry into the “measures deemed
necessary to maintain” adherence to principles of free expression on campus.
The resulting Woodward Report lamented the perilous condition of important
15.

Stephanie Saul, Campuses Cautiously Train Freshmen Against Subtle Insults, N.Y. Times (Sept.
6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/07/us/campuses-cautiously-train-freshmenagainst-subtle-insults.html.

16.

PEN America, And Campus for All: Diversity, Inclusion, and Freedom of Speech at
U.S. Universities 62 (Oct. 17, 2016), https://pen.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/PEN_
campus_report_05.19.2017.pdf.

17.

See Robert Shibley, Free Speech: Not Just a ‘Diversion’ from Campus Protests, FIRE (Dec. 4, 2015),
https://www.thefire.org/free-speech-not-just-a-diversion-from-campus-protests (discussing
protesters’ demands for speech codes penalizing “unintentional” behaviors, including
“gestures” at Emory and other colleges); Nina Burleigh, The Battle Against ‘Hate Speech’ on College
Campuses Gives Rise to a Generation that Hates Speech, Newsweek (June 3, 2016) (numerous campus
restrictions on jokes, gestures), http://www.newsweek.com/2016/06/03/college-campus-free
-speech-thought-police-463536.html.
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values on campus—“free expression, peaceful dissent, mutual respect and
tolerance”—but insisted that free speech trumps all other priorities, including
most centrally the “important” value of “a decent respect for others.”18
The Woodward Report rests on the premise that intellectual freedom and
“growth and discovery” require “the right to think the unthinkable, discuss
the unmentionable, and challenge the unchallengeable.” That belief, the
committee wrote, is “embodied in American constitutional doctrine but not
widely shared outside the academic world.”19
A university, the committee explained, is distinguished by its “central
purpose”—the “discovery and dissemination of basic knowledge with teaching.”
To that end, the report posited in words that still resonate today, the university
can never let other “important values,” including “friendship, solidarity, harmony,
civility, or mutual respect,” take precedence over its commitment to unfettered
intellectual inquiry. The report highlighted the university’s commitment to
protecting speakers whose views contradict majority opinion. When tough
choices need to be made, “It may sometimes be necessary in a university for
civility and mutual respect to be superseded by the need to guarantee free
expression.”20 Joining a university community constitutes an undertaking to
live by that principle.
B. The University of Chicago
It seems fitting that two of the leading examinations of free speech and
universities emanate from the University of Chicago, often regarded as the
nation’s first modern research university.
In 1967, at the height of a wave of student activism aimed at achieving civil
rights for African-Americans, ending the war in Vietnam, and supporting a
burgeoning feminist movement, the University of Chicago appointed law
professor and First Amendment scholar Harry Kalven to chair a committee
charged with analyzing “the University’s role in political and social action.”21
The Kalven Committee’s starting place was the same as the premise of the
Woodward Report: The “distinctive mission” of a university, distinguishing
it from all other institutions, is promoting knowledge. Universities offer
“challenges to social values, policies, practices, and institutions” through the
instrumentality of “the individual faculty member or the individual student.”
Serious intellectual inquiry requires that the university “be hospitable to, and
18.

Yale College, Report of the Committee on Freedom of Expression at Yale (Dec. 23,
1974) [hereinafter Woodward Report] at §§ 1, 2, http://yalecollege.yale.edu/deans-office/
policies-reports/report-committee-freedom-expression-yale.

19.

Id.

20.

Id.

21.

U. of Chicago, Kalven Committee, Report on the University’s Role in Political and
Social Action (Nov. 11, 1967) [hereinafter Kalven Report], https://provost.uchicago.edu/
reports/report-universitys-role-political-and-social-action.
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encourage the widest diversity of views within its own community,” in order to
serve its unique communal mission of “teaching and research.”
The requirement that universities encourage challenges to received wisdoms
precludes a university from taking a stance on the “pressing issues of the
day.” To do so, the Kalven Report emphasized, would “endanger[]” the very
conditions that allow “that full freedom of dissent on which [the university]
thrives.” A university, the report concluded: “cannot insist that all its members
favor a given view of social policy, . . . however compelling and appealing
[that view] may be . . . . It must respect . . . a diversity of viewpoints.”22
A new generation revisited these issues in 2014 when the President of the
University of Chicago appointed Geoffrey Stone to chair another committee,
charged with “articulat[ing] the University’s overarching commitment to free,
robust, and uninhibited debate.”23
The Stone Report reiterated familiar principles: “It is not the proper role of
the University to attempt to shield individuals from ideas and opinions they
find unwelcome, disagreeable, or even deeply offensive.” Rather, individuals
on the campus must assess one another’s expression and, the Stone Report
urged, respond where needed, “not by seeking to suppress speech, but by
openly and vigorously contesting the ideas they oppose.”24
This is classic free-speech doctrine, without exception or gloss, applied to
the college campus: The best response to bad speech is more and better speech.
And it provides the needed context for understanding a much-discussed
letter a dean at Chicago wrote to admitted undergraduates who were about
to matriculate in 2016. It warned that upon enrolling they should anticipate
“challenge” and “even discomfort.”25
C. Reactions
Some commentators reject the basic premises of these three seminal reports.
Responding to campus brouhahas, Jelani Cobb, writing in The New Yorker,
accused defenders of free speech of using a diversionary tactic, and of seizing
a “default for avoiding discussion of racism.”26 A professor of history and
African-American studies at Georgetown argued that free speech was hardly
22.

Id.

23.

Geoffrey R. Stone et al., Free Speech on Campus: A Report From the University
Faculty Committee, (Jan. 6, 2015) [hereinafter Stone Report], http://www.law.uchicago.
edu/news/free-speech-campus-report-university-faculty-committee.

24.

Id. at 2.

25.

John Ellison, Dean of Students in The College, The Chicago Maroon (@ChicagoMaroon),
Twitter (Aug. 24, 2016, 2:31 PM), https://twitter.com/ChicagoMaroon/status/76856146518
3862785/photo/1?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw.

26.

Jelani Cobb, Race and the Free-Speech Diversion, New Yorker (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.
newyorker.com/news/news-desk/race-and-the-free-speech-diversion.
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sacrosanct: “Each campus has to decide if regulating free speech is the best
choice for its own community.”27
Most dramatically, perhaps, in 2016 Morton Schapiro, the President of
Northwestern University, defending “safe spaces,” dismissed First Amendment
concerns as those of “lunatics” and “idiots.”28 Those objections cannot be
permitted to gain traction. The jurisprudence is clear. First Amendment
doctrine has never entertained the prospect that other worthy values, including
equality and dignity, could outweigh freedom of expression.29
In short, as the seminal reports underscore, free expression in college is not
just a matter of law or luxury. The academy’s central mission is to promote
critical thinking in teaching, learning and research: grappling with unsettling
views and information, suspending beliefs, challenging long-held truths,
and seeking to refine and articulate new, more complex understandings. This
requires students (and faculty) to challenge and be challenged. One cannot
say it too often: “A good university, like Socrates, will be upsetting.”30
IV. Campus Speech Codes and the First Amendment
Despite the centrality of free speech to the mission of higher education,
common provisions of college codes aim to suppress offensive expression, or,
more accurately, expression that might offend an identifiable group. Many
of these regulations aim to stamp out expression that the First Amendment
protects—the only expression I am concerned with here.
As many readers of this article know, some categories of expression are
excluded from the First Amendment’s protections. The state does not need
to tolerate such unprotected expression anywhere, including on college
campuses. Among the limited categories of unprotected speech the most
important for our purposes here are “true threats,” “incitement,” and “fighting
words.”
A college does not violate speech rights when, for instance, it suspends and
bars from campus a student who sent threatening messages to a peer, including
27.

Marcia Chatelain, The Free Speech Straw Man, Dissent Magazine (Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.
dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/free-speech-campus-straw-man.

28.

Peter Kotecki, Schapiro to Freshmen: People Criticizing Safe Spaces ‘Drives Me Nuts,’ Daily Northwestern
(Sept. 21, 2016), https://dailynorthwestern.com/2016/09/21/campus/schapiro-to-freshmen
-people-criticizing-safe-spaces-drives-me-nuts/.

29.

See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) and discussion infra pp. 18, 21-22. See also
Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986)
(non-obscene speech objectifying and demeaning women is protected).

30.

Kalven Report, supra note 21.
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“I’ll kill you nigger.”31 That statement meets the demanding definition of a true
threat.32
The First Amendment also distinguishes between expression and conduct,
though that line is often murky. Conduct that violates constitutionally
permissible rules and statutes may always be punished without violating a
speaker’s rights. Some, perhaps many, incidents involve a mix of conduct and
expression.33
For example, when a student at Ole Miss and a companion hung a noose on
the campus statue of James Meredith, the African-American who integrated the
campus in 1962, they engaged in illegal conduct as well as symbolic expression.
Under federal law, they conducted a “symbolic lynching,” calculated to
threaten and intimidate black students; they were prosecuted under federal
civil rights law and ultimately pled guilty to a misdemeanor offense.34
A. Hate speech and harassment.
The targets of regulations on speech by college students are variously
described as hate speech, harassment, and speech that creates a hostile
environment, which are legally distinct categories of expression.
Two justifications are commonly offered for restricting certain controversial
but constitutionally protected campus speech. First, these limitations on
expression are motivated by the best sort of paternalism. The drafters seek to
protect the intended targets, members of vulnerable groups and individuals,
from assaults on their dignity. Second, the proponents of regulation emphasize
the risk that hateful expression will encourage, justify or support violent acts
aimed at the targets of hostile speech, a concrete harm that Jeremy Waldron
and others have emphasized is substantiated by history.35
Indeed, the lessons of history have led most other Western democracies to
ban hate speech. But those countries don’t have our First Amendment.
In the United States, the First Amendment erects a barrier to government
regulation until the hate-filled expression rises to the level of incitement to
31.

Nadia Dreid, U. of Alabama Student Is ‘Removed from Campus’ After Racist Threat, Chron. Higher Educ.
(Oct. 5, 2016), http://www.chronicle.com/blogs/ticker/u-of-alabama-student-is-removedfrom-campus-after-racist-threat/114940.

32.

To qualify as a true threat, the words must “communicate a serious . . . intent to commit an
act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.” Virginia v. Black,
538 U.S. 343 (2003). The circuits are split over whether true threats should be analyzed under
an objective or subjective standard in order to determine whether the statement conveys a
threat of injury. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).

33.

The nuances and difficulties of distinguishing the nonexpressive parts of conduct from
expressive acts are beyond the scope of this article.

34.

Susan Svrluga, Former Ole Miss Student Pleads Guilty to Hanging Noose Around Statue Honoring the
First Black Student, Wash Post (Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
grade-point/wp/2016/03/24/former-ole-miss-student-pleads-guilty-to-hanging-noosearound-statue-honoring-the-first-black-student/?utm_term=.f81461b35b4c.

35.

Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (2012).
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criminal activity, a standard almost impossible to meet. Justice Kagan, while
she was a law professor, concluded that an “exceedingly narrow speech code”
aimed at discriminatory harassment, including racist hate speech, might satisfy
what she called “a reasonable system of First Amendment law,” but would not
withstand scrutiny under our speech doctrine.36
In R.A.V. v. St. Paul the Supreme Court eliminated any uncertainty about
whether the Speech Clause protects racist speech: it does. R.A.V. overturned
a municipal statute criminalizing hate speech. The Court held that the law
violated the Speech Clause by singling out for prohibition speech that would
“arouse anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion or gender.” The statute specifically mentioned Nazi swastikas and
cross-burning as the kind of expression the city wished to inhibit.37
The statute permitted positive references to the listed characteristics, the
Court concluded, but deprived opponents of “tolerance and equality” of tools
for expressing their views. The Court held that St. Paul violated speech
rights by selecting certain viewpoints for opprobrium and criminal penalty—
that is, biases against selected groups, including those at the heart of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, the Court stated, the municipality had
“sufficient means at its disposal to prevent such behavior” (the “reprehensible”
conduct of “burning a cross in someone’s front yard”) without imposing the
majority’s views about “group hatred” on those who disagreed, no matter how
“benighted” their views.38
Commentators have criticized R.A.V., but it is very difficult to distinguish
the goals of St. Paul’s ordinance from those that underlie campus antiharassment codes. To the extent that campus speech codes reach a much
broader swath of expression than the ordinance at issue in St. Paul, by banning
micro-aggressions, debates about affirmative action and so forth,39 the St. Paul
statute stood on much firmer First Amendment ground than the prototypical
campus code.
Many people question whether rude epithets, crude jokes, and disparaging
statements are the kind of expression that merits First Amendment protection.
The Supreme Court has long held the Constitution protects the right to
speak “foolishly and without moderation.”40 You might maintain that racist,
misogynist and other vile speech makes no contribution at all to the exchange
of ideas—but the Speech Clause protects even so-called low-worth expression,
in large part because no public authority can be trusted to distinguish valuable
36.

Elena Kagan, When a Speech Code Is a Speech Code: The Stanford Policy and the Theory of Incidental
Restraints, 29 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 957 (1996).

37.

R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 377.

38.

Id. at 396 (emphasis added).

39.

Nina Burleigh, The Battle Against ‘Hate Speech’ on College Campuses Gives Rise to a Generation that Hates
Speech, Newsweek, May 26, 2016.

40.

Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (quoting Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S.
665 (1944)).
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from worthless expression.41 The government cannot ban hateful expression,
no matter how hurtful.
Indeed, in Snyder v. Phelps, the Supreme Court held that deeply wounding
personal abuse is even immune to civil actions by those it targets. The Court
recognized the harms such expression causes: “Speech is powerful. It can
stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and—as it
did here—inflict great pain.” But, considering the Westboro Baptist Church’s
provocative picket signs near a military funeral, the Chief Justice continued,
“On the facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker.
As a Nation we have chosen a different course—to protect even hurtful speech on
public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.”42 Those expressing
racist, misogynist, anti-Semitic, anti-immigrant or other views widely regarded
as vile,” the Court cautioned, may argue that their words address matters “of
political, social, or other concern to the community.”43 Respecting the rights
of such speakers is, the Chief Justice wrote, the only way to “provide adequate
‘breathing space’ to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.”44
In 2017, as this article was going to press, the Supreme Court forcefully
reiterated the principle yet again in Matal v. Tam, a case involving the same
kind of racially disparaging content that has provoked so much campus
controversy.45 Tam, an Asian-American musician, had sought to trademark the
name of his band, THE SLANTS, a “derogatory term”, the Court explained,
“for persons of Asian descent;” Tam adopted the name to strip the slur of “its
denigrating force” and “reclaim” it.46 The U.S. Patent Office refused to grant
trademark registration based on a provision of the federal trademark statute
(the Lanham Act) that required it to deny registration to disparaging marks.47
41.

Id. at 25 (“governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions in this area”).

42.

Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460-61 (2011) (picket signs included “Thank God for IEDs,”
“Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” and “God Hates Fags”).

43.

Id. at 444.

44.

Id. at 458 (citations omitted).

45.

Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017), affirming In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir.
2015). Other purported slurs the PTO refused to register include Redskins, The Christian
Prostitute, and Mormon Whiskey; the PTO registered marks for Mormon Savings, Dykes
on Bikes, and Squaw Valley (a ski resort). See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1329-37. The Tam decision
led civil litigants to abandon efforts to block a National Football League team’s use of the
name Redskins, ending a dispute that began in 1972. Ian Shapira and Ann E. Marimow,
Washington Redskins win trademark fight over the team’s name, Wash. Post (June 29,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/2017/06/29/a26f52f0-5cf6-11e79fc6-c7ef4bc58d13_story.html?utm_term=.9c9cf102d6d9.

46.

Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1750.

47.

15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act). In re Lebanese Arak Corp., 94 U.S.P.
Q. 2d 1215, 1217 (T.T. A. B. 2010) (§ 2(a) bars marks that “may be disparaging to a substantial
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Tam pursued his claim in court, and the Federal Circuit sitting en banc found
that the statute’s disparagement clause violated the First Amendment.48
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute’s disparagement
clause violated the Speech Clause because, “It offends a bedrock First
Amendment principle: Speech may not be banned on the ground that it
expresses ideas that offend.”49 “Speech that demeans on the basis of race,
ethnicity, gender, religion, age, disability, or any other similar ground,” Justice
Alito wrote, “is hateful, but the proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence
is that we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought we hate.’ ”50
The Lanham Act’s definition of disparagement depended in large part on
whether a substantial portion of the referenced vulnerable group, “ ‘would
find the proposed mark . . . to be disparaging in the context of contemporary
attitudes.’ ”51 This, the Court held, was nothing less than viewpoint
discrimination that violated the rights of private speakers.52 Although the
statute “evenhandedly prohibits disparagement of all groups,” Justice Alito
wrote, and “applies equally” to “both sides of every issue,” it was doomed
because: “Giving offense is a viewpoint.”53
Outside the trademark context, returning to speech between everyday
people (including on college campuses), offensive speech about race, gender
or ethnicity might be treated as harassment, but only if it meets the legal
definition of harassment under federal or state law. Most civil and criminal
anti-harassment laws limit their reach by requiring that harassing speech must
be repeated, not a one-off, and must be directed at a specific individual in
a pervasive or severe way. If offensive speech on college campuses satisfies
the state’s definition of harassment, the school may refer the speaker to law
enforcement for prosecution or assist the target in filing a civil lawsuit seeking
a restraining order and/or damages.
B. Student speech rights in elementary and secondary schools
Speech that appears to, or intends to, disparage racial or other groups, or
that harasses, or offends in other ways, is constitutionally protected even when
the speakers and targets are much younger: public school students in grades
48.

In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1321.

49.

Matal, 137 S. Ct at 1751.

50.

Id. at 1764 (Alito, J.) (quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes,
J.).

51.

Id. at 1754 (quoting the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (Apr. 2017)).

52.

Id. at 1749, 1763 (Alito, J.), Opinion of Kennedy, J. (concurring) at 1750, 1765 (viewpoint
discrimination disposes of the issues).

53.

Id. at 1763 (Alito, J.) (listing numerous cases standing for the proposition that speech “‘may
not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some’” listeners). The
Court concluded, without determining what standard of review applied to infringements of
expression in the context of trademarks, that the disparagement clause did not survive the
intermediate review applicable to commercial speech. Id. at 1763-64 (Alito, J.)
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K-12. In Saxe v. State College Area School District, decided in 2001, the Third Circuit
overturned a high school “anti-harassment” code that was indistinguishable
from a standard college speech code. The goal was laudable, the court said,
and familiar to those demanding respect on college campuses: to “provid[e]
all students with a safe, secure, and nurturing school environment.” To that
end, the rules outlawed “verbal or physical conduct based on . . . actual or
perceived race, religion, color, national origin, gender, sexual orientation,
disability, or other personal characteristics, . . . which has the purpose or effect
of . . . creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment.”54
Writing the opinion in Saxe while he sat on the Third Circuit, Justice Alito
emphatically rejected the proposition that harassing speech can be silenced
based on its content, viewpoint, or impact. The code could not survive First
Amendment analysis, even the special, easier-to-satisfy version applicable
to secondary schools (discussed below). The code, Justice Alito explained,
had no boundaries: It “could conceivably be applied to cover any speech
about some enumerated personal characteristics the content of which offends
someone.”55
The court tackled the dilemma directly: There is a “very real tension
between anti-harassment laws and the Constitution’s guarantee of freedom
of speech.” Justice Alito underscored, “There is no categorical ‘harassment
exception’ to the First Amendment’s free speech clause.” Years before he
authored the Court’s decision in Matal v. Tam, Justice Alito explained that
“‘Harassing’ or discriminatory speech, although evil and offensive, may be
used to communicate ideas or emotions that nevertheless implicate First
Amendment protections.”56
Other lower courts agreed. Recognizing that insults wound, the Seventh
Circuit held that a high school speech code offends the First Amendment
when it infringes on slogans appearing to disparage LGBTs. Even in a high
school, where most students are minors, the targets of disparagement have no
legal right to be protected from hurt feelings, or from “criticism of their beliefs
or for that matter their way of life” at the hands of their peers.57
Judge Richard Posner initially entertained the view that the words “Be
Happy, Not Gay,” if found to be disparaging, could be censored because
they had the potential to profoundly undermine the education of LGBT
students. Ultimately, however, he authored the court’s opinion holding that
the First Amendment protects disparaging T-shirts, presumably including
those bearing two more direct hypothetical put-downs he considered
54.

Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 202 (3d Cir. 2001).

55.

Saxe, 240 F.3d at 217. The plaintiffs were religious Christians who alleged their school’s rules
prevented them from speaking out against homosexuality as they believed their religion
required. College students may also argue that their religious beliefs require them to speak
out about certain practices.

56.

Saxe, 240 F.3d at 209. See discussion of Matal v. Tam supra pp. 20-23.

57.

Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. # 204, 523 F.3d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 2008).
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indistinguishable in their impact from Be Happy, Not Gay: “blacks have
lower IQs than whites” and “a woman’s place is in the home.”58
The cases I have been discussing exemplify deeply embedded, foundational
First Amendment principles. The Supreme Court did not abandon these
principles when it crafted the special doctrine governing student speech in
elementary, middle and secondary schools. A brief overview of school speech
doctrine illuminates the First Amendment stakes in potentially wounding
words, especially those that offend prevailing wisdoms.
In 1969 the Supreme Court upheld the right of students in grades K-12 to
wear black armbands to protest the war in Vietnam, seizing the opportunity
to emphasize that controversy about deeply held beliefs is exactly what the
Speech Clause protects. The right to contest accepted wisdom is a critical part
of what makes the United States such a vibrant society, as the Court explained
in Tinker v. Des Moines:
Any departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation
from the majority’s opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the
lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of another person
may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we
must take this risk, Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); and our history says
that it is this sort of hazardous freedom—this kind of openness—that is the basis
of our national strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans who
grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious, society.59

Under Tinker, officials violate the Constitution when they censor the
personal expression of students in grades K-12 unless the school can show
that it reasonably anticipated the student expression would materially
disrupt the school’s educational mission. While the Court subsequently gave
schools great discretion to silence certain categories of student speech (lewd,
school-sponsored and pro-drug),60 student speech that disparages groups
or individuals is generally the student’s own non-lewd speech, which has
constitutional protection unless it threatens material disorder.61
The Tinker opinion expressly rebuked school officials who claimed they had
censored the antiwar sentiments in part to spare the feelings of students who
were friends with a recent graduate who had died in the war. That concern,
without evidence of impending disruption, amounted to no more that the
illicit desire to “avoid the controversy” armbands might provoke. Hurt feelings
58.

Nuxoll, 523 F.3d at 674.

59.

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 503 (1969).

60.

Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. 260 (1988); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).

61.

Catherine J. Ross, Lessons in Censorship: How Schools and Courts Subvert Students’
First Amendment Rights (2015).
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and arguments, the Court exhorted, are a price of liberty: “[O]ur Constitution
says we must take this risk.”62
Under Tinker and its progeny, words barred by many college codes are
constitutionally protected even in grades K-12 unless they are likely to create
substantial disorder. This means, for example, that a school must allow
students to wear Confederate symbols unless it has a history of serious racial
conflict, including violent incidents. An elementary or secondary school must
expect its students to tolerate display of a symbol that upsets them, unless
its use threatens to materially disrupt the campus. The question of whether
officials reasonably anticipate material disruption turns on the specific history
of race relations in the school and the community.63
What about the boy who purchased a controversial T-shirt at a church fair
and wore it to school? The shirt proclaimed: “Homosexuality is a sin! Islam is
a lie! Abortion is murder!” A federal court ruled that the teenager had the right
to wear his shirt, even though it could be expected to offend several groups
of people.64 Efforts to silence similar sentiments in the name of supporting
diversity at another school led a different judge to condemn the teacher who
had “modeled oppression and intolerance.”65
That approach means that schools may not permissibly shelter students
in grades K-12 when words cause hurt feelings—whether the verbal assault
consists of racial epithets, anti-immigrant sentiment or slut-shaming. It is
unconstitutional for K-12 public school principals to punish children who
hurl racist and sexist insults at classmates unless the slur is accompanied
by physical acts. Without physical assault, hurtful words are, in the words
of a Supreme Court opinion, “simple acts of teasing and name-calling” that
even elementary schools are not legally required to prevent notwithstanding
executive branch edicts to the contrary.66 More than that, if bullying consists
of words alone—no matter how toxic—the Speech Clause usually protects the
speaker and prevents the state from imposing punishment.
Constitutional doctrine asks our youngest students to use the traditional
constitutional responses to vile speech: Walk away, don’t listen, or respond
with “more and better speech.” These general First Amendment principles
apply with at least as much vigor to college campuses, where most students are
adults, not schoolchildren, the guiding ethos of higher education supplements
constitutional mandates, and students are not compelled to attend. Looking
at what the Constitution requires in grades K-12 reveals a lot about what we
should expect the adults enrolled in college to have the capacity to withstand.
62.

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.

63.

Ross, supra note 61, at 168-86.
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Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 965, 967 (S.D. Ohio 2005).
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June 19, 2013).
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Since our constitutional framework expects this degree of coping from
children beginning in elementary school, it is not asking too much of college
students to handle offensive sentiments by using the standard First Amendment
tools: Walk away, throw the pamphlet in the trash, get off the screen or, even
better, tackle objectionable speech with more and better speech.
Whether in the world at large or in elementary and secondary schools, R.A.V.,
Tam, Saxe, and school speech doctrine make clear that hate speech codes aimed
at speech the government condemns based on viewpoint are presumptively
unconstitutional. In holding that the Speech Clause protects the expressive
aspects of flag-burning, even though burning the flag offends and can provoke
observers to anger, the Court underscored: “If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit
the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive
or disagreeable.”67
C. College speech codes
And yet schools at every level, from the elementary grades through
graduate training, persist in adopting codes of conduct that reach a great
deal of constitutionally protected speech.68 Indeed, they do so often knowing
that disciplinary codes (those that are more than aspirational) face virtually
insurmountable First Amendment obstacles if challenged in court.
Federal courts have overturned every college speech code or rule that provided
penalties for expression variously identified as “demeaning,” “derogatory,”
“stigmatizing,” and the like.69 The earliest cases involved the first round of
67.

Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).

68.

Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE), https://www.thefire.org. Greg
Lukianoff, FIRE’s President, notes more optimistically elsewhere that the proportion of
campuses it labels “red light” based on substantial restrictions of speech has declined from
62.1 percent in 2013 to 49.3 percent in 2016. See Lukianoff, supra note 11.

69.

Bair v. Shippensburg Univ., 280 F. Supp. 2d 357 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (upholding only one section
of the code because it did not include disciplinary provisions). A code may also survive if it
appears to reach only unprotected speech. Coll. Republicans at S.F. State Univ. v. Reed, 523
F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1007 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (barring “intimidation” and “harassment” limited to
speech that threatens the health or safety of others). The gamble may be that the code will
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given their temporary status at a school and risk facing high personal costs when they take
on the college in which they are enrolled, or because colleges have presumed that students
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publicized college speech codes based on whether it concludes the code satisfies free-speech
requirements. FIRE’s efforts (complemented by litigation and threats of litigation) have
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the “red light” zone of First Amendment reprobates. See, e.g., FIRE, Spotlight on Speech
Codes 2017, https://d28htnjz2elwuj.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/12115009/
SCR_2017_Full-Cover_Revised.pdf (last visited June 8, 2017) (A “red light” institution is
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schools has declined for the ninth year in a row. The decline has been especially striking at
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modern college speech codes, adopted in the 1980s primarily out of concern
for a growing influx of African-American students. An examination of those
early cases suggests that little progress has been made in the last three decades:
Code proponents have not learned much about the constitutionality of the
impulse animating speech codes, about how to draft more deftly, or about the
complexity of applying codes without trampling rights, sometimes asserted by
members of the very groups the codes intended to safeguard.
In one of the earliest cases, litigated before R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Matal v. Tam and
some of the other seminal Supreme Court cases discussed above were decided,
a federal court overturned as vague and overbroad a University of Michigan
code adopted in response to perceptions of “a rising tide of racial intolerance
and harassment on campus.” The court explained, “[T]he terms ‘stigmatize’
and ‘victimize’ are not self defining . . . . What one individual might find
victimizing or stigmatizing, another individual might not.”70 And speech
rights of speakers may not be limited based on the responses their expression
elicits from listeners. Deference to listeners’ sensibilities holds echoes of the
forbidden heckler’s veto, but is even more nefarious where the code finds a
violation if even one listener reports being offended.71
The University of Michigan provided a guide containing examples of
speech and conduct that would violate the code. Several of the hypotheticals
so transparently violated speech rights that the university withdrew it while
the litigation was ongoing. One example of a sanctionable offense was: “ ‘A
male student makes remarks in class like “ ‘Women just aren’t as good in this
field as men,’ ” deemed to “ ‘creat[e] a hostile learning atmosphere for female
classmates.’ ” The court agreed with the graduate student who challenged the
code that it would prevent him from discussing questions relating to gender
and race differences in his course on comparative animal behavior.72
The Michigan guide warned students that they would be considered
“harassers” if they “tell jokes about gay men and lesbians” or “laugh at a joke”
someone else told about a person with a disability, or “display a [C]onfederate
flag” on a dorm room door.73 Similar provisions are found in college speech
codes today.74
Six years later, African-American athletes at Central Michigan University
successfully challenged a code that banned, among other things, intentional
and unintentional “verbal behavior” that permitted listeners to “infer negative
connotations about the individual’s racial or ethnic affiliation.” The facts seem
public colleges (from seventy-nine percent to thirty-three percent).
70.

Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 859 (E.D. Mich. 1989).

71.

Id. at 860 (the university’s goal was to reach speech that was “only . . . offensive” and
therefore could not be regulated without violating speech rights).
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Id. at 858.

73.

Id.

74.
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analogous to Simon Shiao Tam’s reappropriation of the term Slants: Central
Michigan basketball players sued the university because the code banned
the word “nigger,” which they themselves used. The district court held that
the policy violated the First Amendment because it reached “a substantial
amount of protected speech,” including politically valuable speech. Moreover,
university officials retained too much discretion to decide what amounts to
“negative” or “offensive” speech. Consistent with Justice Harlan’s famous
observation that “one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric,” the court reasoned,
“different people find different things offensive.”75 Illustrating the dilemma,
the athletes who sued were divided: Some found it objectionable when their
white coach used the term nigger, and others did not.76
V. Gendered Assaults and Speech that Creates a Hostile Environment
Verbal disparagement and hostility based on gender (like hostility based on
race or ethnicity) demean and undermine. This reality makes efforts to rein in
verbal attacks based on gender critical to discussions of how to prevent sexual
assaults by and against students.
When I was an undergraduate in the first class of women to graduate from
Yale College, my assigned advisor for my major (the very first Yale professor
I met with), handed me a pin he had been given at a restaurant, suggesting it
was better-suited to me than to him. It read: “Eat me.” I confess that back then,
it never occurred to me to report the incident. We were supposed to soldier on.
I just told him to sign my program and not to expect to see me again. Today, I
consider his words a macro-aggression. I should have complained to someone.
He was a faculty member, not a fellow student. Different rules apply.
When I told this story while speaking about universities and free speech
at a 2016 reunion, most of the women in the room responded, “Similar things
happened to me and I never told anyone.” The reaction illustrated how
powerfully hurtful words stick with us, just as the outpouring of women’s
recollections of unwanted touching at the hands of strangers followed the
airing of Donald Trump’s “grab ’em by the pussy” remarks, which many
properly regard as a verbal sexual assault.
No student ever said anything nearly so offensive to me. But imagine if the
speaker had been a peer. Or if one of them, anticipating our current President,
had asserted in the dining hall, even jokingly: “I love to ‘grab some pussy!’ ”
Can a college penalize such expression by one student to another?
No court appears to have decided whether colleges violate students’ First
Amendment rights by punishing them for sexualized, insulting or disparaging
speech directed at other students.77 But there are plenty of reported allegations
to help us analyze the question based on the framework I have laid out.
75.

Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971); Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1184
(6th Cir. 1995).
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Perhaps one of the best-known is the 2010 incident in which inebriated,
newly-admitted members of one of Yale’s few fraternities marched around
the area housing freshmen with banners and chants: “Yes means no, no
means anal.” The misogynistic rhetoric was widely regarded as mass sexual
harassment. Yale promised to reprimand those involved, a process that remains
confidential. The incident brought revelations that the U.S. Department of
Education (“DOE”) was already investigating Yale for failing to rein in a
hostile sexual environment created by reported incidents ranging from “taunts
to assaults” over a seven-year period.78 But a bright line divides “taunts” from
assaults and rape. The latter are criminal acts. The former may be protected
expression even if it is “stupid,” “raunchy,” and deeply unsettling.79
As commentators around the country debated the significance of the Yale
chant, and the fraternity apologized for its actions in the wake of criticism
(including from two other Yale fraternities), one online comment asked why
nobody at the national governing body of Delta Kappa Epsilon or on the
campus had “said something and intervened.”80 One Yale undergraduate
woman told The New York Times that, like many others, when she heard the
chants, she “thought it was really obnoxious and closed the window.”81 Both
responses are completely consistent with best First Amendment practices.
Here’s a harder case.
In 2007 Jennifer Dibbern entered the Material Science and Engineering
Ph.D. program at the University of Michigan, where she was one of five women
among twenty-five graduate students. She was forced out of the program before
completing her degree. When Dibbern filed a sexual harassment complaint in
federal court she alleged the following:82
As soon as she enrolled, the male students in her programs began harassing
her, with statements including these:
“ ‘Real women aren’t engineers.’ ”
educational environment, that the university failed to respond to reports of a sexually
hostile environment, or that a student was retaliated against for reporting a sexually hostile
environment.
78.
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“ ‘Engineering women are . . . not normal . . . they aren’t like real girls.’ ”
“ ‘You’re less qualified but still able to get in because you’re a girl.’ ”

Worse, male graduate students told her “they masturbated with her in
mind and planned to call her at climax.” When Dibbern reported these verbal
attacks to her advisor, she was told “boys can be like that.”
Dibbern began to keep a record of these comments and incidents. After one
of her peers threatened to rape her and described how he would do it, Dibbern
reported him to university officials, and went once more to her advisor, who
told her it was important to “get back to the lab.” When Dibbern finally went
to the university’s Title IX coordinator, after the incidents escalated to include
physical contact and stalking, he warned her that people “assume women false
report” and that “some women . . . are overly sensitive . . . can’t take a joke
and feel offended.”
The harassment continued. One male graduate student persistently made
“inappropriate comments” about Dibbern’s appearance and about the
attractiveness of other female students.
I’ve largely omitted conduct by Dibbern’s graduate student peers to center
the discussion on the speech of her fellow students. Imagine if, instead of
ignoring Dibbern’s complaints, and allegedly retaliating against her for
reporting the department and for organizing with other women students, the
university had silenced the male graduate students who made discriminatory
and harassing remarks or removed them from the Ph.D. program.
Imagine further that those students asserted the university had violated their
speech rights. This is the dilemma colleges face as they attempt to respond to
the demands of the federal government that they silence sexually assaultive
expression.
Before I analyze the Dibbern facts, I need to summarize the governing law.
Davis v. Monroe Board of Education (1999), the seminal case addressing whether
schools have a duty to protect students from hostile environments created by
peers, provides the standard in cases involving peer-on-peer harassment in
colleges, although it involved speech and conduct aimed at a fifth-grade girl.83
Davis alleged that another student, a sexual bully, harassed her for several
months on the school bus and in class, rubbing his body against hers and
peppering her with vulgar statements such as “I want to get in bed with you,”
and “I want to feel your boobs” (while he attempted to grab them).84
A divided Court held that the Davis family could sue her school for
“deliberate indifference” in failing to respond to this harassment, but only because
the bully engaged in assaultive physical conduct as well as verbal assaults.
Damages would not be available unless the “harassment” proved “so severe,
83.

Papelino v. Albany Coll. of Pharmacy of Union Univ., 633 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2011) (Davis
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84.

Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999).

760

Journal of Legal Education

pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim’s access to
an educational opportunity.”85
In case these legal boundaries might be misunderstood or swept aside, the
Court underscored it had no intention of allowing the law to reach “simple
acts of teasing and name-calling among school children . . . even where these
comments target differences in gender.”86
The federal government has gone much further than the Supreme Court
in holding schools responsible for what students say to one another. As
documented in the 2016 Association of American University Professors
(“AAUP”) Council report on The History, Uses, and Abuses of Title IX (the “AAUP
Report”), since 2011 the Office of Civil Rights within DOE (“OCR”) has
adopted an activist stance with respect to the culture of gender as well as
gender discrimination and sexual assault.87 It has largely disregarded the
boundaries Davis established by (i) eliminating the conduct requirement so
that schools will be held accountable for peer-on-peer verbal assaults; and
(ii) diluting the required showing that the verbal assault effectively barred the
target’s access to an educational opportunity, instead requiring only that it
create a “hostile environment.” A hostile environment, in turn, has not been
defined consistently.88
At the same time, the AAUP Report argues, OCR has “broadened” its
definition “of sexual harassment in ways that limit the scope of permissible
speech.”89
In fact, for nearly fifteen years, OCR has cavalierly disregarded the conflict
between speech rights and efforts to rein in purely verbal bias addressed by one
student to another. As early as 2003 college administrators sought guidance
from DOE about the relationship between students’ First Amendment
rights and what seemed to be a federal requirement under Title VII (which
addresses racial discrimination) that institutions of higher education impose
hate speech codes. Specifically, they asked whether the government intended
universities to intrude on First Amendment rights to comply with emerging
DOE requirements. DOE responded through a “Dear Colleague” letter, an
advisory statement addressed to educational institutions, issued outside the
85.

Id. at 629.

86.

Id. at 653.

87.
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normal administrative procedures and lacking the force of law; nonetheless, it
can be used to threaten schools with the potential loss of federal funds.
DOE’s 2003 answer to whether it required colleges to violate students’
speech rights boiled down to “of course not.” It failed to offer any legal
guidance, or even to refer to First Amendment standards. It did not make
any effort to help administrators distinguish what Davis called “simple acts
of teasing and name-calling” from grave verbal attacks that a school might
regulate without violating the First Amendment.90 Nor has it provided any
additional guidance on this delicate problem in the intervening years.
Colleges seem to have addressed the deficits in the 2003 “Dear Colleague”
letter by embedding rules that bar students from creating a hostile educational
environment for their peers within the anti-harassment section of the
institutional code. That may satisfy the federal government, but it does not
make the code compliant with the Speech Clause.
Moving from race to gender, beginning in 2011 the OCR conflated sexual
violence covered by the criminal code with sexual harassment (including a
hostile environment based on speech).91
By 2013 OCR went even further. Summarizing its findings that the
University of Montana had violated Title IX, it defined sexual harassment
to include “verbal . . . conduct of a sexual nature” that is unwelcome, “whether
or not it creates a hostile environment” if it is either “severe or pervasive.” 92 In
2016 the Department of Justice joined OCR in “defining sexual harassment
as ‘unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature,’ including ‘verbal conduct’ and
‘regardless of whether it causes a hostile environment.’”93 Labeling speech “verbal
conduct” does not transform expression—protected by the First Amendment—
into conduct, which the First Amendment does not immunize and which, if
legitimately proscribed, is always subject to penalty.
Those regulations and Davis provide some of the guidance we need to
analyze the Dibbern problem set forth above. The derogatory and sexually
charged expression directed at Dibbern by her male peers clearly constituted
forbidden expression under definitions promulgated by OCR and DOJ. Under
this view, the comments amounted to unwelcome verbal sexual violence.
90.

Letter from the Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ.,
First Amendment: Dear Colleague (July 28, 2003) [hereinafter “Dear Colleague” letter]
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And those comments combined with additional conduct I have edited out
of the facts surely could meet the higher standard set out in Davis, assuming
that Dibbern could establish at trial that the sexually harassing speech of her
colleagues was “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive” that it effectively
barred her access to an educational opportunity. It seems that if she could prove
her allegations, Dibbern could show that the verbal attacks she experienced
made it impossible for her to spend sufficient time in the laboratory, like the
hypothetical exclusion from a computer lab Justice O’Connor offered in Davis
to illustrate denial of educational opportunity.94
But even assuming that the verbal assaults aimed at Dibbern were
sufficiently “severe, pervasive and objectively offensive,” that they satisfy Davis
(and if these facts don’t amount to denial of educational opportunity, it is
hard to imagine what would), that would mean only that the university had a
legal responsibility to protect Dibbern from verbal assaults at the hands of her
fellow students.
That conclusion does not resolve the central question that concerns us here:
The school may be legally obliged to curtail the speech of the male graduate
students, but can it do so without violating their expressive rights? Only if
the speech amounts to harassment under the law. Dibbern involves much more
than the “hurt feelings” courts have said won’t erect a defense when a school
silences protected speech. (Here, the students stalked and threatened Dibbern,
presumably crossing the line to harassment).
Because almost all lawsuits involving bullying and harassment involve
conduct as well as expression, no court has answered this question to date.
For records involving less dramatic facts than Dibbern, the answer should be
clear from my earlier discussion of hate speech and harassment: There is no
hate speech or harassment exception to First Amendment rights, even where
the public institution is required to protect the target of assaultive speech.
One foundational principle of speech jurisprudence is that we cannot
trust the government to distinguish among topics, viewpoints, or manner of
expression. Yet college students who demand reforms aimed at curbing what
they see as noxious campus environments seem to trust college administrators
to distinguish what I have called the “tepid” from the “scalding,” or what the
Supreme Court has called the “intolerable” verbal invasion (which it did not
define), or the micro-aggression (perhaps unintended but causing cumulative
harm) from the macro-aggression that could permissibly be silenced after a
single verbal incident.95 In the lower grades, schools have suspended a sixyear-old for calling a peer a “poo-poo head” (tepid), but have failed to rein in
students who called a high school classmate a “cum-guzzling slut” (scalding).
94.
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I doubt that colleges will prove more adept than K-12 officials at sorting out
these categories, or knowing what the First Amendment permits them to do.
Colleges appear to validate the First Amendment’s skepticism about the
judgment and motives of government officials by distrusting students’
discretion and resiliency. Even elite universities treat students like children
when expression is at issue. Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker is reported
to have “bemoan[ed] that Harvard students are ‘pressured to sign a kindness
pledge suitable for kindergarten’ and ‘muzzled by speech codes that would
not pass the giggle test if challenged on First Amendment grounds.’ ”96
He is right. As I have shown, First Amendment doctrine places heavy
demands on students regardless of age, grade, or sophistication. In the process,
it offers an opportunity to learn how to cope with and respond to difference
and to tumult.
Once the principles I have discussed so far are understood, it should prove
much easier to sort out what the First Amendment requires (or permits) in the
myriad battlegrounds of contemporary campus life, some of which I turn to
now.
VI. Uncomfortable Spaces
First Amendment doctrine contemplates speech in public spaces. Campus
speech is complicated by the reality that a campus includes many different
types of spaces, devoted to different uses. Some are public (whether open to
the public at large or the college community), some are dedicated to certain
uses that may require controlling access and activities (e.g., research labs,
archival collections), and others—most notably dormitory rooms—are meant
for private use. A campus is often both a workplace and a residence.
Is a college unable to shelter a student who lives in a dorm from being
assaulted by offensive chants outside her window? What about noxious
comments voiced loudly in the corridor outside her room? Assuming that
a college could successfully control offensive comments in public spaces on
campus, should students who want to act like verbal hooligans have the liberty
to say whatever they want in the privacy of their dorm rooms?
The argument that a college is a student’s home cuts both ways. Speakers
have no right to intrude into the privacy of a home, but people have a right
to receive and peruse (and its reciprocal, a right to voice) in their own homes
96.

Bryan Schonfeld, Campus Censors Do N. Korea Proud, N.Y. Daily News (Dec. 29, 2014),
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even communications that the First Amendment does not protect.97 Some
have analogized noxious speech that can be overheard to secondhand smoke,
arguing that people should not be endangered by others’ poor choices. But
there is no constitutional right to smoke.
This does not mean that students who feel assaulted by repeated racist,
gendered, or other comments that target them are without recourse. The rights
of speakers don’t extend to forcing someone to continue to room with, live
next door to, or otherwise be kept in proximity to a student whose words and
ideas feel noxious. The student who feels under attack can request, and the
college can grant, assignment to a different roommate or a different residence
hall without violating the speaker’s rights. There is no right to accost unwilling
listeners in the privacy of their homes.
VII. Solutions
College officials are not helpless in the face of assaultive speech or
speech that wounds the speakers’ peers. No constitutional hurdle restrains
administrators and individual faculty members or resident counselors in
dormitories from promoting chosen messages, including exhortations that
encourage empathy, sensitivity, tolerance of difference, and civil norms. And
nothing keeps them from finding ways to turn volatile moments that divide
communities into teachable moments designed to nourish young people, as
many college deans and presidents have done, even while recognizing the
offender’s constitutional right to provoke.
Exhortations about speech can contain two messages that may initially
appear contradictory but are in fact complementary.
First, colleges should educate students about the meaning of the First
Amendment, about their own speech rights, and about the speech rights of
peers with whom they disagree. Orientation should expose students to the
constitutional requirements and norms of free expression, which they likely
have not acquired by the time they graduate from high school.98
Lectures and materials can also reassure those whose personal beliefs do not
run to tolerance that they are entitled to their own views. This is the paradox
of tolerance for intolerance, so long as it is limited to belief and expression,
and does not cross over into discriminatory conduct that violates the law or
college rules. And this approach provides a helpful barrier against accusations
that colleges are nothing more than instigators of liberal brainwashing.99
Second, schools can encourage students to use expressive rights responsibly,
to consider how their words affect others, and particularly to avoid slurs and
name-calling. Colleges by all means should exhort students not to succumb
to any aspect of campus culture that promotes sexism or racism. But officials
97.

Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (right to possess obscene material in the home).

98.

Catherine J. Ross, College Is Too Late to Teach Free Speech, Chron. Higher Educ. (Feb. 12, 2017),
http://www.chronicle.com/article/Collge-Is-Too-Late-To-Teach/239147.

99.

E.g., Kirsten Powers, The Silencing: How The Left is Killing Free Speech (2015).

Assaultive Words and Constitutional Norms

765

cannot penalize students who decline to recalibrate their own beliefs, give lip
service to what they don’t believe, or adopt community norms.
Public colleges can also let students know that while the First Amendment
bars the school from punishing students for their protected expression,
employers—whether private or public—are not constrained in their ability to
punish offensive speech by declining to hire in the first instance, denying raises
and promotions, or terminating employment. Indeed, federal law may require
employers to discipline workers for speech that creates a hostile environment.100
College leaders can also teach by example. In March 2015 some forty
or fifty Emory students protested, “We are in pain!” after someone chalked
“Trump 2016” around the campus. To be fair, the complaining Emory
students recognized the anonymous scrawler’s free-speech rights. At the
same time, convinced that Trump incites “hate against others,” they found
his very name “threatening.” They told the university President that they
“perceived intimidation.” The university distinguished the conduct of
temporarily defacing university buildings with chalk from the content of
the message, declined to erase the Trump signs or to pursue the chalker’s
identity, and simultaneously urged the community to “recognize, listen to, and
honor the concerns” the minority students voiced. The President reiterated
the importance of working toward a more inclusive campus. What’s more,
President Wagner himself chalked: “Emory stands for free expression!” with
video cameras rolling.101
Other administrators have led by positive example, as did Texas A&M’s
President, Michael Young (the former dean of my law school). When
someone invited white nationalist Richard Spencer to speak at Texas A&M
in December 2016, Young invited everyone on campus to join him at “Aggie
United,” a counter event scheduled at the same time and directly across
the street from Spencer’s lecture. Young described Aggie United as a stand
against divisive rhetoric he characterized as “beneath contempt,” and a stand
for inclusiveness. The protest against Spencer’s racist talk drew a crowd
several times larger than the one that listened to Spencer, who, according
to a reporter, “sprinkled [his] racist, sexist comments with fat jokes.”102 The
competing event Young organized demonstrated the principles of more and
better speech and the free-speech commitment that hecklers not be allowed to
veto speakers. It also reassured the students targeted by Spencer and his ilk
that their community supported them.
100. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000(e) et seq.
101. Susan Svrluga, Someone Wrote ‘Trump 2016’ on Emory’s Campus in Chalk. Some Students Said They
No Longer Feel Safe, Wash. Post (Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
grade-point/wp/2016/03/24/someone-wrote-trump-2016-on-emorys-campus-in-chalk-somestudents-said-they-no-longer-feel-safe/?utm_term=.19779a6923e7; Nina Burleigh, The Battle
Against ‘Hate Speech’ on College Campuses Gives Rise to a Generation that Hates Speech, Newsweek, June
3, 2016, at 1.
102. Katherine Mangan, At Texas A&M, a White Supremacist’s Visit Incites a Crowd, Chron. Higher
Educ., Dec. 16, 2016, at A30.
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Support for the vulnerable also originates from students themselves. A week
after the 2016 election, Natasha Nkhama, a black student at Baylor University
in Waco, Texas, was forced off a campus sidewalk by someone who addressed
her with a racial slur and said, “I’m just trying to make American great again.”
After Natasha’s friend posted a video of the incident, “hundreds of students
and faculty members walked Natasha to class.”103
A. Speaking out.
Honoring free speech leaves students at liberty—indeed encourages them—
to direct more and better speech to supporting vulnerable peers, and to selfdefense: to speak out against wounding expression, to confront peers whose
words or Halloween costumes offend, and to demand action or retractions
from administrators, as the Yale student captured on YouTube accosting the
faculty head of her residential college did, however intemperately.104
Exercising their rights to free speech and association, students can take
stands that a public college cannot. Students have demanded that their peers
be punished for using racist speech in a dining hall or residency, but they
are in a better practical position than college administrators to identify and
challenge such expression (even if the college could punish racial epithets
without violating constitutional rights).
Students offended by speech in the dining hall that appears to be racist (or
misogynistic), black or white, women or men, have several options. They can
confront the speaker directly. They can ostracize the speaker by not sitting
with him or her. They can send a blast email calling attention to what they
heard and explaining why and how the speech hurt them.
Colleges can encourage the targets of hatred to speak out, and support
them when they do. Anecdotal evidence suggests standing up can be effective.
Reflecting on calls by Yale students to silence racist speech on campus, political
scientist Jim Sleeper recalled that students handled such matters themselves
in the past:
[I]n 1965, . . . one of my college roommates [a Jew] happened upon another
student wearing a Nazi arm-band and mimicking a “Sieg Heil” salute to the
accompaniment of a recording of Der Fuehrer himself. My roommate . . .
never thought of running to a dean . . . . “Why don’t you stop that and turn it
off,” he said, quietly, firmly.
The miscreant smirked, but . . . he stopped.105
103. Adeel Hassan, Refugees Discover 2 Americas: One That Hates, One That Heals, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15,
2016, at A1.
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Reminding us that we have no data about how widespread micro-aggressions
are on campuses or about how the “average” student reacts in the face of
such incidents, a Stanford professor offers a story suggesting that prudence
sometimes favors restraint rather than confrontation, and that students
may have more wisdom than we sometimes acknowledge. On campus, the
professor ran into an acquaintance, a retired Eastern European diplomat,
whom he introduced to another acquaintance, a woman student steeped in
women’s studies. As they chatted, the diplomat shook the man’s hand with
his own gloved hand, and then removed his glove to shake the woman’s hand.
The professor mused, “[Y]ou can imagine what happened next. The woman
recoiled from the gendered micro-aggression and lambasted the diplomat: ‘Do
you think women are too frail to touch a gloved hand or is this some type of
creepy come on?!!’.” In fact, he reports, after the diplomat boarded the shuttle
bus, as the two wondered where the custom of removing the glove had come
from, the woman said: “He’s a sweet old man and I could tell it was his way of
being gallant.”106
Gendered gloveless handshaking seems to me the micro-est of plausible
aggressions, quite distinct from what I think of as verbal macro-aggressions:
calling a black man “boy” or “nigger,” calling a woman a “slut” or a “cunt,” or
singling out either of them to ask if they can follow the lecture in a math class
(as also happened to me in a class full of men the first year women attended
Yale College).
Just as elderly European diplomats bring unknown customs with them,
colleges far from home where students live on campus frequently provide
young people with their first deep exposure to people who are different
from them: persons of different colors, religions, ethnicities, and beliefs.
The godson of white nationalist David Duke recounted how he came to
abandon his godfather’s movement—a movement in which he had once been
regarded as a presumptive heir. “I began attending a liberal college,” R. Derek
Black recalled, “where my presence prompted huge controversy.” By talking
with many “diverse” people “who chose to invite me into their dorms and
conversations rather than ostracize me—I began to realize the damage I had
done.”107
More support for the principle of more and better speech.
B. Bystanders.
Understandably, the most vulnerable students—the targets of verbal and
sometimes physical assault—are often cowed, and may be reluctant to engage
2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jim-sleeper/the-blame-the-campus-libe_b_9219598.
html.
106. Keith Humphreys, An Anecdote About Campus Microgressions and Intolerance, Wash.
Monthly
(Jan.
2,
2017),
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an-anecdote-about-campus-microgressions-and-intolerance/.
107. R. Derek Black, Why I Left White Nationalism, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 2016, at SR6.
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with their perceived tormenters. And the harm assaultive speech causes affects
the whole community, not just the intended targets. The victims should not
be expected to shoulder the additional burden of responding to speech that
denigrates them.
This makes bystander intervention especially important. Bystanders with no
skin in the game can have an even greater impact on expression that trespasses
community norms of mutual respect than is possible for the presumptive
targets to achieve. The literature on bullying shows that many bullies fear being
on the receiving end of confrontation. Students can step up to shame peers
who persist in verbal denigration—an approach that has proved successful in
discouraging bullying among younger students.108
Supportive bystanders may have a critical role to play in efforts to transform
campus culture to reduce the risk of sexual or racial assaults. A 2015 controlled
study suggests a “socio-ecologic model” that can help to transform not just
the individuals who may become perpetrators of sexual assault but also “the
context of relationships, communities, and the larger society.” This approach
requires active participation of bystanders in rejecting violations of positive
norms and promoting models of respect and healthy interaction. Still, the
author cautions, even if universities put all of these elements in place, “[t]here
are no easy solutions.”109
Because First Amendment analysis is highly dependent on facts and
context, it is important to disaggregate a number of factors, including who is
speaking, and where the expression takes place. I’ve primarily been exploring
the speech rights of individual college students, but let me briefly explore two
slightly different scenarios, both involving speech by groups.
C. Groupspeak.
Sometimes, as illustrated by the case of Yale’s chanters, the speaker is
actually a group. Of course, groups have speech rights, whether they are
informal gatherings, chartered organizations, or corporations. Many people
behave worse in groups than they do on their own, egged on by group
dynamics. When groups rather than individuals speak on campus, reactions
tend to be more intense. The context may affect the constitutional analysis.
When members of a fraternity engage in offensive speech, as DKE did at
Yale, and as the Texas Tech chapter of Phi Delta Theta (“PDT”) did when it
hoisted a banner repeating the chant that had gotten DKE into trouble several
years earlier, they can and sometimes do lose their national charters. PDT
International Fraternity suspended the Texas Tech chapter (as Delta Kappa
Epsilon did at Yale and SAE did at the University of Oklahoma following a
YouTube video showing members in a racist rant). After a review, PDT placed
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its Texas Tech chapter in escrow, removed its leaders and did something more:
It required all members of the Texas Tech chapter to complete training in
sexual assault prevention and bystander intervention. The fraternity joined
other Greek organizations in forming a “Fraternal Health and Safety Initiative”
to address campus rape culture.110
Private organizations, including fraternities and sororities, have the legal
power to enforce such codes of behavior on affiliates and individual members.
They can also, for example, bar the display of insignia such as the Confederate
flag or the swastika. And I don’t see any problem if college administrators
solicit the help of national membership groups in achieving what the college
itself is not allowed to do.
Things get more complicated when we turn to groups that are funded
and sponsored by the college itself, organizations that observers may believe
officially represent the institution.
During the 2016-17 academic year, Harvard alumnae who had played on
the 2012 women’s soccer team published an op-ed in the university newspaper
documenting that male athletes had ranked their women counterparts based
on appraisals of their bodies and sex appeal. Refusing to be shamed, and
labeling the men’s behavior “an aberrant display of misogyny,” the women
demanded a response. Following an investigation, Harvard suspended the
soccer season of the current men’s team, which had updated the so-called
“scouting report” on Google, including jokes about the women’s preferred
sexual positions and activities. Other colleges also suspended teams in 2015
after uncovering denigrating speech by athletes.111
These episodes raise two important questions. First, on what basis may
the university strip athletes of their opportunity to compete based on
constitutionally protected expression? Arguably, the athletes represent their
institutions when they face other colleges. Schools actively recruit and support
athletes, and train them to play wearing the school’s insignia and colors.
Administrators might be able to corral each of these incidents within the
notion of “school-sponsored” speech, a concept the Supreme Court developed
110. Tara Culp-Ressler, Fraternity Loses Its Charter After Displaying ‘No Means Yes’ Banner at a Party,
ThinkProgress (Oct. 8, 2014), https://thinkprogress.org/fraternity-loses-its-charter-afterdisplaying-no-means-yes-banner-at-a-party-9a7522f1181c#.g084taota. The President of the
University of Oklahoma had initially suspended two fraternity leaders, only to rescind his
action after realizing the First Amendment stood in the way. Geoffrey R. Stone, Racist Rants
and the University of Oklahoma: Getting It Wrong, Huffington Post (May 11, 2015), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/racist-rants-and-the-univ_b_6844500.html.
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in Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, a case involving a high school newspaper. Hazelwood
gives elementary schools and high schools wide discretion to discipline
expression for reasons “related to legitimate pedagogical concerns” if observers
might conclude the speech bore the school’s imprimatur.112 Although, as I have
argued, the rationales that the Supreme Court offered for crafting a unique
speech doctrine for elementary and secondary schools should not apply to
higher education, many courts apply Tinker and its progeny when they analyze
whether colleges have violated students’ speech rights.113
Yet the Harvard athletes’ controversial expression took place backstage, not
as part of the team’s public performance. Here, constitutional facts matter.
It appears the Harvard soccer scouting report was available to the public on
Google documents. If colleges cannot discipline athletic teams for group
speech that outsiders, including donors and alumni, might think the school
endorses, no one else has the power to do that.
For these reasons, athletic teams may be distinguishable from social
organizations like fraternities. When members of a University of Oklahoma
fraternity sang a racist song on a bus, recorded and displayed on YouTube,
they were joining together in exercise of their individual speech rights, albeit
in an ugly manner. Recall that private national organizations had the legal
power to censure them.
That distinction sounds good until we look a little closer. The Harvard
recruiting report reflected rank sexism, even if the young men intended it as
humor. No one defended its contents.
But some groupspeech by organizations that may seem to represent a
college has more laudable and even political aims and yet offends observers.
In the fall of 2016, nineteen members of East Carolina University’s marching
band kneeled during the national anthem in protest against police violence
against unarmed black men, inspired by San Francisco 49ers’ quarterback
Colin Kaepernick. The crowd booed. The nineteen protesters and those who
booed were all engaging in free speech. So were two other band members
who unfurled an American flag and held it high while others knelt. This was a
robust conversation.
Fortunately, the university’s chancellor supported the speech rights of the
kneelers, but he might not have. School sponsorship might have provided
a defense if he had penalized them. And the band’s director threatened:
“[S]imilar protests ‘will not be tolerated moving forward.’ ”114 I, for one, would
not favor suppressing the band members’ speech, and believe that reasonable
observers understand that neither the protest nor the Harvard men’s soccer
112. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270-73 (1988) (allowing censorship of a
high school newspaper produced by a journalism class).
113.

E.g., Keefe v. Adams, 840 F. 3d 523, 531 (8th Cir. 2016); Tatro v. University of Minnesota, 816
N.W. 2d 509, 520 (Minn. 2012).

114. Editorial, At ECU Protest, Students Get and Give a Lesson About Free Speech, Charlotte Observer,
(Oct. 6, 2015), http://charlotteobserver.com/opinion/editorials/article106494972.html.
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team’s ranking of women players spoke for the universities whose uniforms
the students wear.
This brings me to the second question: What is the most effective
institutional response? At Harvard, the women who exposed the problem
called on men to join them in combating sexism and misogyny on campus.
Male soccer players publicly undertook to do that. Experts on gender
disagreed with one another about whether public shaming and social stigma
for sexist athletes or “meaningful consequences” like a lost season were
more powerful motivators of change. One expert on gender predicted that
punishment and “public humiliation” would only make “offensive behavior
. . . even more private,”115 just as laws against hate speech in Europe may push
such expression underground.
D. Modest proposals.
At the symposium that led to this issue, organizers and others urged me
to move beyond my analysis of what existing jurisprudence requires. In this
concluding section I offer two proposals aimed primarily at law schools.
The first proposal responds to that invitation in the playful spirit I often
urge on my students. But I must offer an important caveat: I do not endorse
the first proposal, and am unprepared to do so until further analysis resolves
the myriad First Amendment issues it presents. The second proposal is more
straightforward and easily accomplished.
1. Holding professional degree students to professional codes
Professional schools in various fields assert that they may hold degree
candidates to the ethical and practice norms of the professions students are
preparing to enter, including norms that limit expression in the work context.
Accepting this principle, judges have upheld administrators’ decisions to
remove students from professional programs, rejecting allegations that the
student’s speech was constitutionally protected.116
For example, the Eighth Circuit held that a community college did not
violate Craig Keefe’s expressive rights when it removed him from an associate
degree nursing program. Keefe had posted comments on his personal
Facebook page that upset other students. The comments were not part of his
curricular work, but criticized the program and other students; some statements
seemed threatening. The nursing program concluded that Keefe had problems
managing his anger and accepting professional boundaries. He ignored a
115.

Wilson, supra note 111.

116. E.g., Keefe v. Adams, 840 F.3d 523, 526-33 (8th Cir. 2016) (relying on the Nurses Association
Code of Ethics and citing cases), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1448 (2017); Tatro v. University of
Minnesota, 816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012) (professional requirements of the mortuary
profession). Cf. Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2988-89 (universities
are not entitled to deference on whether they have “exceeded constitutional constraints,”
but courts will accord “decent respect” to the “pedagogical approaches” of a professional
program).
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professional requirement that nurses show respect for others. Supervisors
were concerned that peer discomfort arising from Keefe’s comments would
interfere with patient care. The dean of students focused on Keefe’s “lack of
remorse, lack of concern” that the posts were “unprofessional.”117
Rejecting Keefe’s First Amendment claims, the court joined other
jurisdictions in deferring to the discretion of schools that train health
professionals to assess academic performance based in part on “character”
related to professional requirements. It recognized that applying such
standards might restrict speech that would otherwise be protected: Where
professional ethics standards are a “permissible academic requirement, then
determinations of non-compliance will almost always be based at least in
part on a student’s speech.”118
This line of cases suggests that law students too could be held to the same
standards as practicing attorneys and judges, who risk censure when, in their
professional capacity, they disparage others based on race, gender and other
aspects of identity.
Rule 8.4 (g) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, promulgated
in 2016, supports exploration of this approach. Imposing a black letter
requirement to replace previous guidance about what is expected of licensed
attorneys, the new rule bars “harassment or discrimination on the basis of
race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation,
gender identity, marital status or socioeconomic status in conduct related to
the practice of law.” The rule creates a legally enforceable national standard in
line with requirements that were already in place in twenty-five jurisdictions.119
At a minimum, professional responsibility courses should seize the
opportunity of teaching Rule 8.4 (g) to probe more deeply into inadvertent and
unexplored derogatory attitudes and expression. (This educational approach
is consistent with the suggestions for proactive engagement offered in Section
VI). Numerous reported instances of professional discipline for speech that
would violate Rule 8.4 (g) already can be gleaned from the states whose rules
have been in place longer.
In one instance, a California judge sanctioned a male attorney who, in the
court’s words, “stooped to an indefensible attack on opposing counsel,” when
he responded to her request that he stop interrupting her: “[D]on’t raise your
voice to me. It’s not becoming of a woman.” The judge admonished: “A sexist
remark is not just a professional discourtesy.” Such “comments,” he continued,
“reflect and reinforce the male-dominated attitude of our profession.” Judge
Paul Grewal made the punishment fit the crime by requiring the offending
117.

Keefe, 840 F.3d at 526-31.

118. Id.
119. Model Code of Prof’l Conduct, r. 8.4(g) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2016).
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attorney to donate money to the Women Lawyers’ Association of Los Angeles
Foundation.120
Comment 3 to Rule 8.4 (g) clarifies that it is intended to reach “verbal
conduct.”121 As I have argued, however, conflating speech and conduct does
not turn expression into conduct that can be punished without violating
expressive rights.122 The drafters urged that expression would be protected
since the rule does not interfere with lawyers’ ability to say what they want
when they are not engaged in conduct related to the practice of law. The
Supreme Court, however, has never located “the point where regulation of a
profession leaves off and prohibitions on speech begin” under the professional
speech doctrine.123 This issue requires further exploration.
I have not found any reported cases involving law school discipline based
solely on verbal manifestations of discrimination,124 but law schools have
long cautioned students that their behavior after matriculation might create
impediments to bar admission.125 Bar admissions proceedings provide a useful
analogy to law school discipline.
The egregious case of white supremacist Matthew Hale, denied admission
to the Illinois bar in 1998, remains the leading example of expression deemed
evidence that an applicant to the bar lacked the requisite character. Hale, an
avowed racist and anti-Semite, headed an organization that sought to gain
power by “peaceable means” and then to deport “Jews, blacks and others [he
referred to as] the ‘mud races.’ ” Hale nonetheless asserted he could take the
oath to join the bar “in good conscience” and would abide by rules barring
“discriminatory treatment” of persons engaged with the justice system. But,
120. Claypole v. County of Monterey, No. 14-cv-02730-BLF, 2016 BL 9428 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12,
2016).
121. Id.
122. See also Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1215-21 (9th Cir. 2013) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc) (criticizing the lack of a “principled doctrinal basis” when
considering professional speech for separating “utterances that are truly ‘speech,” from
those that are “somehow ‘treatment’ or ‘conduct’”).
123. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (White, J., concurring); Wollschlaeger v. Governor of
Florida, 848 F.3d 1293, 1310 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (the Supreme Court has never clarified
what standard applies when reviewing inhibitions of professional speech).
124. The cases involve conduct as well as expression. E.g., Willet v. City University of New
York, 1997 WL 104769 (Feb. 18, 1997) (denying further leave to amend the complaint and
dismissing action where law student was disciplined for falsifying his grade point average
when applying, was not a resident of New York as required for attendance, and, among other
things, claimed he was disciplined for calling the children of a classmate “zebra children,”
where the offensive remark did not provide the motive for his suspension).
125. I thank Renee DeVigne and Robert Tuttle for thoughtful conversations related to the
material in this section. In 1990, Gerald Uelmen reported that the State University of New
York, Buffalo affirmatively asked “state bars to deny admission to former students who
violate[d] its hate speech code.” Gerald Uelmen, Campus Hate Speech Codes: A Pro-Con Discussion
of Speech Codes and Free Speech, Santa Clara U. Character Educ. (Nov. 15, 1990), https://www.
scu.edu/character/resources/campus-hate-speech-codes/.
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Hale warned, he would not be bound by the state’s constitutional ban on
“communications” that incited hatred based on “reference to religious, racial,
ethnic … affiliation,” which he regarded as unlawfully abridging his First
Amendment rights.126
The Committee on Character and Fitness concluded that there was no
room in the legal profession for a person whose “life mission” was to “deny
the equal protection of the laws” to all who were not within his definition
of the “white race,” albeit using non-violent and legal means. Such views,
the committee concluded, could not be reconciled with the moral character
required of lawyers, in light of the unique obligations imposed on officers of
the court to preserve certain “fundamental truths” about “individual dignity.”
Such incontrovertible truths, the report continued, include the principle that
persons are not to be “judged on the basis of . . . skin color, race, ethnicity,
religion or national origin.” In short, “Mr. Hale’s life mission, the destruction
of the Bill of Rights, is inherently incompatible with service as a lawyer . . .
who is charged with safeguarding those rights.”127
The facts in Hale are as extreme as the candidate himself, suggesting the
risk that the old maxim “hard cases make bad law” applies. Is Hale sui generis? If
not, where would the boundary lie? Is it possible to identify objective criteria
to determine what dissident views are so extreme they disqualify a candidate
from bar admission? Recall that Matthew Hale disavowed violence.
Consider a different set of circumstances, in a state that follows the letter
of Obergefell v. Hodges by allowing same sex couples to marry but denies married
same sex partners the usual privileges that flow with marriage. Would it be
constitutionally permissible to withhold bar admission from a law-abiding
young person who just passed the bar exam and plans a career supporting the
rights of same sex married persons, including the right to list both spouses
on birth certificates and other civil privileges flowing from marital status?128
Or for a bar admission committee in the deep South of the 1950s to withhold
admission from a prospective civil rights attorney who had never been arrested
for civil disobedience?
Dissenting, one member of the Hale panel urged that the applicant be
taken at his word that he could both “hold racist views and practice law in
accordance with his oath as an attorney” until his conduct in practice proved
126. Geoffrey C. Hazard et al., The Law of Ethics and Lawyering 1045, 1046-47 (2010)
(quoting In re Hale, Committee on Character and Fitness for the Third Appellate District
of the Supreme Court of Illinois (1998)).
127. Id. at 1051, 1053.
128. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2071 (2015), V.L. v. E.L, 136 S. Ct. 1017 (2016)
(reversing Georgia Supreme Court ruling denying a lesbian the right to adopt her partner’s
children); Smith v. Pavon, 505 S.W. 3d 169 (Ark. 2016), cert. granted sub nom Pavan v. Smith, 137
S. Ct. 2015, 2077 (2017) (per curiam) (reversing opinion below on the ground that Obergefell
requires that states apply the “same constellation of benefits” to all spouses, including the
right of a spouse to be listed on the birth certificate of a child conceived with donated
sperm).
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otherwise.129 Distinguished commentators agreed with Matthew Hale that
the ruling impermissibly penalized his expression: Alan Dershowitz offered
to take up the case, so long as he could be assured that Hale eschewed racial
violence.130
In the event that law schools rely on Rule 8.4 (g) to discipline students for
purely verbal “harassment or discrimination”131 they need not always employ
the maximum penalties of suspension or expulsion. The realm of disparaging
speech is well suited to mediation to promote better understanding of the
harms words cause, or restorative justice approaches like those discussed in
Joan Howarth’s contribution to this issue, which would promote healing for
the speaker, the wounded and the entire community.132
2. Counsel and guide the university community
To promote wider understanding of what the First Amendment requires,
I encourage law school faculty members to engage with university
administrators, faculty in other disciplines, and students in every part of the
university. The knowledge and experience of the law school faculty should be
brought to bear in creating a university-wide culture that respects both free
expression and the dignity of all constituent groups. Law school professors
have unique skills that can to help administrators keep free-speech principles
squarely in mind and navigate the complexities of legal doctrine as they
seek to contain campus cultures that may be seen as conducive to group
disparagement and assaultive conduct.
129. Id. at 1053 (Baxter, dissenting).
130. Pam Bellock, Racist Barred From Practicing Law; Free Speech Issues Raised, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1999.
In 2004, Hale was convicted of soliciting the murder of a federal judge who presided over a
copyright lawsuit in which Hale was found to have violated a copyright to the name of the
white supremacist church he presided over. He is currently serving a 40-year prison term.
Matt Hale, Southern Poverty L. Ctr., https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremistfiles/individual/matt-hale (last visited June 8, 2017).
131.

The Report that accompanied Rule 8.4 (g) explained that adopting a black letter rule would
make “an important statement to our profession and the public that the profession does not
tolerate prejudice, bias, discrimination and harassment.” It also “clearly puts lawyers on
notice that refraining from such conduct is . . . a specific requirement.” A.B.A. Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility et al., Report to the House
of Delegates 4 (August 2016). It is limited to “’conduct related to the practice of law”
when the lawyer knew or reasonably should have known the conduct was harassment or
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expression into conduct that can be punished without violating expressive rights, as I have
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lawyers to say what they want when they are not engaged in conduct related to the practice
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132. Joan W. Howarth, Shame Agent, 66 J. Legal Educ. 717 (2017).
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Conclusion
Most of the Supreme Court’s seminal First Amendment cases involved
political dissent and advocacy for legal and social change, such as the civil
rights movement. In the 1950s and ‘60s many white observers, especially in
the deep South, found deeply offensive the protests by African-Americans and
their white supporters who sought integration of public accommodations and
schools, and who demanded voting rights. Proponents of women’s suffrage
and the earliest advocates of rights for LGBTs similarly offended majoritarian
views. The battle over what bathrooms transgendered people should use
continues to arouse fierce sentiments. The Spanish religious inquisitors, Nazis,
Stalinists and others who thought they possessed “truth” stand as examples of
the dangers of squelching opposition and difference.133
Every time we think about the state as a potential ally in limiting someone’s
speech to accomplish laudable aims, we must test that temptation against the
notion that the person who decides what speech will be tolerated will always
be fair, wise, and on the side history will prove was “correct,” however we
define “correctness.” Free-speech doctrine rejects any notion that the state may
ever be the arbiter of truth, however laudable the cause, including making
students of every background feel safe—and be safe—on campus. Where words
are the weapons, the Constitution requires that this important battle be fought
from the ground up.

133. West Virginia St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943).

